Nutzungsbedingungen
Introduction
While there is by now considerable empirical evidence to support the existence of optimal target levels for long-run corporate liquidity holdings (e.g. Kim et al., 1998; Opler et al., 1999; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Bruinshoofd and Kool, 2004 ), little evidence exists on possible non-linearities in the speed of adjustment towards these targets. This is particularly surprising since such non-linearities -motivated by liquidity or financing constraints -play an important role in the related corporate investment literature (e.g. Ono, 2003; Pratap, 2003) .
Obviously, such arguments should straightforwardly extend to the cash management literature. Opler et al. (1999) theoretically demonstrate that the respective shapes of the marginal cost and benefit curves of liquidity holdings in combination with the structure of adjustment costs determine the speed of corporate liquidity adjustment. In their view, target adjustment from below may be faster than from above, due to a flat marginal cost of liquidity curve and a convex marginal benefit curve. At the same time, their setup supports the hypothesis that adjustment speed rises with the size of target deviations, especially on the lower side. Milne and Robertson (1996) and Pratap (2003) provide a theoretical argument for the case where firms are significantly below target, which is based on increasing risk aversion when threatened by liquidation. On the other hand, Myers and Rajan (1998) provide an argument for quick run-downs of too high liquidity because creditors may dislike overly liquid debtors. Bar-Ilan et al. (2004) argue that fixed adjustment costs may lead to non-monotonous adjustment through bands of inactivity around the target. Indirect adjustment costs may also arise, because funds directed to the stock of liquid assets cannot be used as a source of funds elsewhere in the firm. Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) discuss the consequences of liquidity adjustment for the level of dividend payments, while Almeida et al. (2004) focus on the 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   F  o  r  P  e  e  r  R  e  v  i  e  w   2 consequences for future investment opportunities. To the best of our knowledge Almeida et al. (2004) are the only ones to explicitly test such non-linearities empirically. They split their sample of firms into a liquidity-constrained part and an unconstrained part. Liquidity dynamics of constrained firms are shown to differ from unconstrained firms.
The present paper significantly extends this literature through its empirical focus on non-linear corporate liquidity adjustment towards long-run targets. 2 We apply an innovative endogenous threshold regression model to a balanced panel of 450 Dutch non-financial firms for the period 1986-1997. 3 Table 1 describes the variables used in the analysis. We refer to the table for the definition of the variables. is the first-difference operator. Return on assets is earnings after depreciation, interest, taxes and extraordinary gains and losses, but before dividend payments to net assets; Size is the logarithm of net assets expressed in 1990 prices; Interest rate is interest expenses as a fraction of total debt, excluding debts to subsidiary companies. 21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   F  o  r  P  e  e  r  R  e  v  i  e  w   3 
Estimating conditional adjustment with endogenous thresholds
In this section, we first provide a definition of long-run firm-specific liquidity targets. In the motivation of this target definition and the discussion of the relation between the target and long-run determinants of corporate liquidity, we extensively draw on Bruinshoofd and Kool (2004) , which we henceforth refer to as BK04. Subsequently, we introduce a sophisticated threshold estimation method, developed in Hansen (1999) . The advantage of this method is that it allows for endogenous thresholds in a non-dynamic panel. However, using it requires a two -step approach where estimated deviations from long-term targets are inputs in the second stage of threshold determination. In our view, the advantages are sufficiently strong to favor this approach over, for instance, a one-step VECM. Section 3 contains the empirical results of our analysis of conditional target adjustment in corporate liquidity holdings,
Computing Firm-level Corporate Liquidity Targets
In BK04, we start the search for long-run corporate liquidity targets using equation (1). . Since this target definition excludes the firm-specific fixed effect (ˆi ), it may inappropriately ignore unobserved heterogeneity in long-run firmlevel liquidity levels. Therefore, we alternatively introduce a second target measure, the so-
The evidence in BK04 convincingly demonstrates that unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity plays a dominant role in long-run corporate liquidity levels. We therefore conclude in BK04 that firm-specific effects need to be included in the target definition. 6 If done so, we find mean reversion to the 'specific' target to equal 68 percent in one year.
In the current paper, we build on the conclusions in BK04 and use firm-specific targets in our analysis. To keep our panel balanced, we define the liquidity target straightforwardly as the historical average liquidity ratio for each firm individually. 7 In table 2, we provide simple error-correction estimations for corporate liquidity adjustment on the basis of this target definition, using the following specification -identical to the one used in BK04:
(2) Opler et al. (1999) . Originally, net working capital and investment were included in the list of long-run determinants as well. However, they lacked statistical significance in the long-run equation and were subsequently dropped from the analysis. 5 Note the resemblance of our approach with the way that debt targets have been computed in the capital structure literature (e.g. Auerbach 1985 , Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999 and Drobetz and Wanzenried 2006 . 6 This conclusion is independent of the level of aggregation of the included sector dummies; that is, even 2-digit sector dummies do not adequately capture individual firm's idiosyncratic long-run liquidity levels. 7 The motivation for this simplification is that the endogenous threshold method applied later on is tailored to balanced panels and it is unsure whether its asymptotic properties extend to unbalanced panels. At the same time, the dominance of the firm-specific effects in the cross-sectional variation of liquidity targets limits the resulting loss in precision. The first column with estimation results in table 2 presents our benchmark OLS estimation with robust standard errors. The mean reversion coefficient (-0.61) is close to the value found in BK04 where a more sophisticated firm-specific target was used. Also the coefficients on the control variables are qualitatively similar in size and significance to those in BK04. Only for the change in the interest rate, we now find an insignificant effect, as opposed to BK04. As ESS( ) depends on only through the indicator functions ( )
it is a step function with at most nT steps, where n is the number of firms and T the number of years per firm in the data. To reduce the number of regressions involved, a grid search for values of corresponding to the quantiles of Deviation i(t-1) is applied, using the quantiles {1.00%, 1.25%, 1.50%, ... , 89.50%, 89.75%, 99.00%}. 
Note that ( ) LR
is a re-normalization of the error sum of squares for each value of and therefore a by-product of model estimation. The method extends in a natural manner to models with multiple thresholds. We refer to Hansen (1999) for technical details.
Results
We now turn to the joint estimation of thresholds levels and regression coefficients as formulated in equation (3). Horowitz, 2001) . 9 Additionally, Shapiro-Francia W' tests for normality of the residuals of the triple-threshold model reveal that at the 99% confidence level normality is accepted for more than 90% of the firms in our sample. different from zero. Unreported results show that our estimates are only marginally affected by restricting the second threshold to equal zero. For the remainder of the discussion we shall therefore interpret the second threshold as being zero. The first and third threshold estimates are particularly low and high, corresponding with liquidity shortfalls of more than 95% below the target and liquidity surpluses of over 2000% above the target, respectively. Although the third threshold effect is statistically significant, the regime above the third threshold contains only about 50 observations and the estimated threshold estimate is implausibly high. We check the robustness of this threshold by alternately winsorizing and censoring the data. We winsorize our data by removing firms from the sample in such a way that a minimum number of firms is deleted while a maximum number of extreme target deviations is removed from the 10 The Hansen (1999) methodology is tailored to balanced panels, while it is unsure whether its asymptotic properties extend to unbalanced panels. We therefore aim to keep the panel balanced and remove seventeen firms entirely from the sample rather than unbalancing our panel by removing individual observations. 11 We have also censored at the 2 nd and 98 th quantile. This hardly affects the outcomes. samples. We also find that firms respond to particularly large liquidity surpluses (Deviation i(t-1) > ˆ3) faster than they do to more moderate surpluses. As this third threshold is not robust to either winsorizing or censoring, we caution against strong conclusions from this observation.
Lastly, our results do not support the notion of a range of inaction around target liquidity holdings.
Conclusions
The main finding in this paper is that firms bring back liquidity holdings to targeted levels at a faster rate when they are initially below the target than when they start out above the target. No evidence is found to support the existence of bands of inactivity around the target.
Our results reveal a stronger corporate preference for removing liquidity shortages than for removing liquidity surpluses. In relation to the literature on corporate investment and 
Appendix. Sample selection
Our sample is selected from Statistics Netherlands' data on the Finances of Large Firms (SFGO) covering the period 1977-1997. The SFGO provides company specific financial information at the level of balance sheet and income statement items for all Dutch nonfinancial firms with a balance sheet length of at least 20 million Dutch guilders (about EUR 9.1 million). On an annual basis, the data cover 80 to 90 percent of the population.
Occasionally, firms do not report in a given year so that missing data entries arise. In some cases, firms may leave due to financial distress raising the issue of survivorship bias or because they drop below the threshold level of assets. However, in many other cases firms do not leave but simply do not report their financial statements to SFGO in one or more years after which they return. We are unable to distinguish between these different cases. As the In the early years, the number of firms on which Statistics Netherlands reports is quite small. Moreover, data then only cover the manufacturing sector. Data on the services sector start becoming available in 1983 and coverage increases substantially in the first years after.
Therefore, we construct our balanced panel starting in 1986. Utilities firms are excluded from the sample and three more firms are removed because they display extreme volatility in liquidity dynamics. At the end of the day we have a balanced panel with 450 firms covering the period 1986-1997. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
